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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the impact on the Mumbai Stock Exchange of the introduction of screen-based 
trading (the “BOLT”) on 14 March 1995.  We use event study methods to investigate if this 
reform had positive value using two samples of more liquid and less liquid stocks.  We find 
that the impact was substantial: the average CAR for the more liquid A shares was about 4.5%, 
while that for the less liquid B shares was around 10%.  We examine how far this improvement 
was associated with improvements in liquidity, efficiency and (reduced) volatility (LEV).  We 
find evidence of increased liquidity and efficiency but more ambiguous results for volatility.  A 
regression approach provides evidence that cross-sectional variations in the CARs can be 
explained by cross-sectional variations in firm-specific LEV improvements.  Overall, the 
results suggest that the introduction of the BOLT improved the market microstructure for both 
A and B shares, with the effect on B shares being more marked. 
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RSC106506.  However, the interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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with which the authors are associated. 
 
 1. Introduction 
Over the last 25 years, the subject of market microstructure has become a major sub-discipline 
within the field of finance.  Recent surveys of the subject include Stoll (1999) and Madhavan 
(2000).  Not surprisingly, most empirical research on market microstructure has so far been 
concerned with the major industrial countries, particularly the USA.  Meanwhile, the 
development of market microstructure as a subject has coincided with a period of 
establishment of new stock markets and revitalisation of existing markets in many developing 
and transitional economies.  The revitalization of these “emerging” stock markets is typically 
characterized by institutional reforms, including modernization of the trading and information 
systems1, expanding stock market membership, revamping the regulatory framework2, and 
opening access to foreign capital3.  The reforms are aimed at improving stock market 
performance by increasing liquidity and transparency, enhancing efficiency, and reducing 
volatility and trading costs. The wider goal is to promote the development of local capital 
markets and facilitate access to long-term capital. 
Liquidity and transparency are desirable because they reduce the required return by investors 
and therefore increase security values.  Increased liquidity improves the ability of stock 
markets to perform their information processing and signalling functions (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986).  Increased efficiency improves the aggregation and transmission of 
information through price signals, and thus allows agents to make more informed investment 
decisions and spread their risks more effectively (Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997; 
Caprio and Demirguc-Kunt, 1998).  Efficient stock prices and yields provide benchmarks 
against which the cost of capital for and returns on investment projects can be judged, even if 
such projects are not financed through the stock market (Green, Maggioni and Murinde, 2000).  
An efficient price discovery process is traditionally associated with lower fundamental 
volatility, which promotes stock market effectiveness in allocating resources.  High volatility 
can distort resource allocation by making investors more reluctant to hold stocks.  Risk-averse 
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 investors will demand a high risk premium, which increases the cost of capital and reduces 
market liquidity (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997; Kim and Singal, 2000). 
The main issue in emerging markets is whether and how a costly revitalization programme has 
positive value in terms of liquidity, efficiency, and volatility.  In studies of more established 
markets which have implemented reforms in trading systems, Amihud and Mendelson report 
that reform had a generally positive impact, creating gains in efficiency of the price discovery 
process, increased liquidity and lower volatility.  These include studies of Milan (Amihud, 
Mendelson and Murgia, 1990), Tokyo (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991) and Tel Aviv (Amihud, 
Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997).  Blennerhassett and Bowman (1998) report a fall in 
transactions costs on the New Zealand stock exchange following the move from open outcry to 
screen trading, and Majnoni and Massa (2001) report broadly positive results for reforms 
introduced by the Italian Stock Exchange.  There are fewer studies of emerging markets, and 
their results are more mixed.  Some suggest that the entry of foreign investors is a more 
important factor than internal market reform (although the former may be predicated on the 
latter), and that this is followed by increased liquidity and enhanced efficiency in the price 
discovery process, with market volatility either remaining unchanged or declining (Richards, 
1996; Kim and Singal, 2000; Ngugi, Murinde, and Green, 2002a, 2002b).  However, Chang, 
Hsu, Huang and Rhee (1999) found no change in liquidity or in the efficiency of the price 
discovery process, while volatility increased, following the introduction of a continuous 
auction system in Taipei. 
One difficulty in studying emerging markets is that many of the stock exchanges are of recent 
origin and relatively few stocks are traded.  Data from the pre-reform era are often not 
adequate to carry out a full evaluation of the effects of reform.  However, since reform can be 
costly, it is particularly important to quantify its benefits in countries where there may be many 
apparently more pressing claims on investment resources. 
In this paper we investigate the impact of the revitalisation process on the market 
microstructure of the Stock Exchange, Mumbai (BSE) in India4.  The BSE is not a “typical” 
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 emerging stock market, with relatively few quoted companies.  It has the second-largest 
number of domestic quoted companies of any stock exchange in the world after New York, and 
far more quoted companies than either London or Tokyo, for example.  In small markets, a 
main purposes of revitalisation is to encourage fledgling domestic companies and foreign 
entrants to begin using the exchange, and thus to stimulate the expansion of the domestic 
capital market.  In India however, the domestic capital market is long-established.  Indeed, the 
BSE dates back to 1875, but until the 1990s it was subject to tight regulatory restrictions.  In 
this setting, revitalisation may be expected to have a more direct impact in generating more 
efficient trading and allocation of capital for existing companies, as well as the longer-term 
effect of fostering market expansion. 
The sheer size and diversity of the Indian capital market are more than sufficient reasons for 
investigating the performance of the BSE.  However, it also has specific features which make it 
a particularly interesting laboratory for studying reform in emerging stock markets.  First, 
several major reforms took place during the 1990s.  In this paper, we concentrate on the switch 
from open-outcry to electronic trading which took place in a “big bang” in 1995.  Second, 
general data availability in India is exceptionally good for this type of study.  Third, since the 
market is of long-standing origin, we can obtain a relatively large balanced panel of companies 
to evaluate the impact of reforms in a consistent way.  Fourth, the market consists of a wide 
range of shares, some of which are relatively heavily traded, others very thinly traded.  This 
enables us to check precisely how reform had the most impact on securities of varying 
liquidity.  While each emerging stock market may be different, an understanding of the impact 
of reform in India will undoubtedly offer important lessons to other emerging markets. 
The revitalisation of the BSE in the last 15 years has involved both institutional and regulatory 
reform.  For an overview, see Shah and Thomas (2001).  Key institutional changes include: the 
establishment of a new regulatory authority, The Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI); the formation of a second major stock exchange in competition with Mumbai, the 
National Stock Exchange of India (NSE); the suspension and subsequent reintroduction of 
“Carry-Forward” trading, or “badla”, following a stock trading scandal in 19925; and the 
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 introduction of electronic trading, first at the NSE and, shortly thereafter, at the BSE.  
Regulatory reform interacts with market microstructure, and Nayak (1999) has argued that not 
enough attention was given to market microstructure issues in the regulation of India’s stock 
markets.  The impact of the suspension and subsequent reintroduction of Badla was studied by 
Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998), who found that the main effects of Badla were to increase 
both liquidity and noise on the market.  Overall however, they concluded that Badla was 
viewed as value-increasing by the market.  Shah and Thomas (1996) compared market 
performance on the BSE between May-October 1994 and June-November 1995.  The two key 
changes in this period were the commencement of trading at the NSE and the introduction of 
electronic trading by the NSE and BSE.  Shah and Thomas found evidence of improvements in 
liquidity and efficiency6, but their analysis relied on a direct comparison between the two time 
periods, and they acknowledged that this comparison did not permit a precise identification of 
the effect of electronic trading on its own. 
In this paper we concentrate on the impact on the BSE of its major reform of the trading 
system: the introduction of electronic trading, the "Bombay On-Line Trading" system or 
BOLT, which took place in Mumbai in 1995, and was extended to other member exchanges 
throughout India in 1997.  We aim to improve on and extend Shah and Thomas’s (1996) 
research by following Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) and Berkman and 
Eleswarapu (1998) in using the event study methodology as our principle investigative tool.  
We also contribute to event study methodology by testing the duration of the event’s impact; 
and we compare more liquid (‘A’) and less liquid (‘B’) shares.  Thin trading is an important 
issue in the pre-reform and post-reform eras, and we take care to allow for thin trading in our 
estimation procedures.  Our analysis enables us to pin down more precisely the impact of the 
introduction of the BOLT on market performance.  Our results suggest that the introduction of 
the BOLT was followed by a significant improvement in market performance.  We therefore 
examine how far this improvement was associated with increased liquidity, increased 
efficiency, reduced volatility, or a combination of these factors.  In addition, we find 
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 interesting and intuitive differences between the two groups of more and less liquid shares in 
their response to the reforms. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In section 2 we summarise the major changes 
which took place in the BSE during the last 15 years.  In section 3 we describe the dataset used 
in the analysis.  The price reactions to the introduction of the BOLT are estimated in section 4.  
Possible reasons for these reactions are investigated in the next sections: section 5 is concerned 
with the impact on liquidity; section 6 deals with efficiency improvements; and section 7 
considers the effect on volatility.  In section 8, we analyse the relative contributions of 
improved liquidity, efficiency and volatility to the overall price improvements observed in the 
market.  Section 9 contains some concluding remarks.  Details of the estimation period are 
reported in appendix A. 
2. The Stock Exchange, Mumbai (BSE)7 
2.1 Background to Reform 
Established in 1875 as The Native Share and Stockbrokers Association, the BSE is the oldest 
stock exchange in Asia.  It was the only national stock exchange in India until 1994 when the 
NSE commenced trading.  India now has more than 20 stock exchanges, but most of these have 
links with the BSE or the NSE, and only these two are regarded as national exchanges. 
India has sustained a thriving private sector from the earliest phases of industrialization but, 
until recently, its economic policies emphasized the role of state planning and intervention.  
Within this framework, securities markets were governed by three main pieces of legislation.  
First was the Capital Issues (Control) Act of 1947 which authorized the government to control 
new share issues, type of shares issued, and their issue price.  Primary and secondary issues 
were invariably priced at par.  Debenture issues were regulated by ceilings on coupon rates and 
term to maturity, although these were evaded to some extent by deep discounting of primary 
issues.  Second was the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act of 1956 which provided for 
statutory control over stock exchanges.  Under this act, all securities trading must take place on 
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 a recognised stock exchange, and the rules and listing regulations set by an exchange had to 
meet the minimum standards laid down in the legislation.  Third was the Companies Act of 
1956 which set out a code of conduct for the corporate sector in relation to the issue, allotment 
and transfer of securities, and disclosure standards for public issues.  It also regulated 
underwriting, the use of premia or discounts on share issues, substantial acquisitions of shares, 
payment of interest and dividends, annual reporting, and related issues. 
The 1956 acts were mainly regulatory, but the 1947 act was highly restrictive of stock market 
activity.  Moreover, each stock exchange could set its own policy on listing and settlement and 
regulatory agencies had overlapping responsibilities.  This created inconsistencies and lack of 
transparency in implementation of the regulations.  Strict controls on inward investment meant 
that the market was effectively closed to the rest of the world.  Overall, the regulations 
provided a powerful disincentive for companies to finance their activities through the private 
capital market8. 
Historically, the BSE was regarded as a sideshow in the economy, and it had little incentive to 
modernise.  It operated an open outcry trading system on the floor of the exchange, which was 
characterised by high transactions costs and intermittent trading of a relatively few stocks, 
often held by a small group of investors.  The market for most stocks was quite illiquid, 
especially as securities lending and derivatives markets were not permitted.  The clearing 
system was fragile, and the settlement procedure was slow and unreliable, based as it was on 
the shipment of physical security certificates, a process which brokers could manipulate.  
Barriers to entry inhibited competition, especially in the brokerage industry which operated 
largely as a cartel9. 
Until recently, a unique feature of the BSE was its system of leveraged trading on the cash 
market, called "carry forward" or "badla".  Badla trading permitted cash settlement to be 
postponed to the next account period.  When settlement was due, a buyer could borrow funds 
from and pay interest to the lender, called contango charges (‘vyaj badla’).  Conversely, a short 
seller could borrow securities and pay interest called backwardation charges (‘undha badla’).  
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 For further details see the Patel Committee (1995).  Two of the main practical problems with 
the system as it existed through 1993 were that settlement could in theory be postponed 
indefinitely, and that there were no formal margin requirements.  Thus, badla fostered complex 
highly leveraged positions which substantially exacerbated settlement risks.  In 1992, the BSE 
was hit by share-dealing manipulation and fraud associated with a sharp rise in prices and 
subsequent collapse10.  Badla did not directly cause this fraud, but it was generally believed 
that it did make fraud easier (Shah, 1997) and, following an investigation, SEBI banned all 
forms of badla in December 1993.  A revised form of badla was reintroduced in 1996 on the 
recommendation of the Patel Committee (1995).  Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) studied the 
impact on stock returns and market liquidity of the abolition and subsequent reinstatement of 
badla.  They found, inter alia, that the abolition of badla produced a significant decrease in 
market liquidity and that the market subsequently reacted positively to the announcement of 
the reintroduction of badla, suggesting that badla did improve liquidity and this was valued 
positively by the market.  However, in July 2001 badla was abolished altogether when a T+5 
rolling settlement system replaced settlement according to a fixed account period. 
2.2 Key Reforms in Regulation and Trading 
The main regulatory reform of the capital markets took place in the early 1990s, with the 
repeal of the Capital Issues (Control) Act and the coming into force in January 1992 of the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, which established SEBI as the principal 
authority governing stock exchanges and a range of other corporate financial activities.  
Agarwal (1996) describes this act in detail.  Subsequently, SEBI introduced several new 
regulatory measures including capital adequacy rules for brokers, a share depository system 
involving (from December 1997) progressive dematerialization of securities, and an investor 
guarantee fund.  Derivatives were legalised and capital markets opened up to foreign 
institutional investors, but stamp duty on share transactions remained in effect.  In the same 
period, the Reserve Bank of India liberalized its credit control regime, and ceilings on 
debenture coupon rates and other interest rates were abolished. 
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 Institutional reforms took place in the stock markets in the same epoch.  The NSE opened in 
1994 with a nationwide screen-based trading system, which it presented as more transparent, 
competitive, efficient and less vulnerable to fraud than the BSE's old system.  Bond trading 
quickly gravitated to the NSE, but the BSE has retained much of the share-trading business, in 
part because of the reform of its own systems and practises11.  Trading reforms on the BSE 
included: the introduction of odd-lot trading, separate trading in renounced rights and warrants, 
direct trading in share index baskets, and the reduction of settlement time leading to 
progressive elimination of the fixed account period.  Regulatory reforms by the BSE included 
the establishment of an investor protection fund with guarantees substantially in excess of the 
minimum required by SEBI, a trade guarantee fund to eliminate broker-counterparty risk in 
settlement, a stock exchange brokers' contingency fund to make short-term advances to 
members facing a temporary mismatch of funds, and a comprehensive insurance policy.  These 
measures were underpinned by the introduction of circuit breakers and improved monitoring of 
brokers' margin positions by the exchange. 
The centrepiece of the modernisation of the BSE was the introduction of its own screen-based 
trading system: the BOLT12.  Initially, the BOLT was a mixed order-driven and quote-driven 
trading system which accepted and disseminated two-way price quotations from authorized 
jobbers13, and market and limit orders from authorized brokers which could be matched 
directly according to the order-book rules in the system.  Initially, priority was given to the 
quote-driven system with the order book functioning as an auxiliary jobber.  The order-book 
allowed for the retention and matching of orders against one another where no quotes existed 
in the system for a particular security, and it improved the price competitive character of the 
market in case individual investors were willing to deal at prices better than the best jobber's 
quote.  Over time however, the order book assumed increasing importance, and in 2001 the 
facility for placing quotes on the system was removed altogether.  The BOLT is now strictly an 
order-driven system.  However, during the period relevant to this study it was a mixed system 
as we have described. 
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 The BOLT was introduced on March 14th 1995 when 818 shares were transferred to electronic 
trading (all A shares and the most liquid B shares14).  The remaining shares (over 5000) were 
transferred in stages, and all shares were on the new system by the 50th trading day.  On 
August 30 1997, the BOLT was expanded to provide direct connections with other exchanges 
in India and by 2000, over 200 locations outside Mumbai were connected to the BSE through 
the BOLT.  The option of dematerialized settlement became available in a limited range of 
stocks on December 29 1997, and by September 30 2001, all companies were required to sign 
agreements for the dematerialization of their securities. 
At the time of the introduction of the BOLT, securities traded on the BSE were classified into 
two groups: specified shares (A group) and non-specified shares (B group).  Companies with a 
large capital base, widespread shareholding, a steady dividend, good growth record and a large 
volume of business in the secondary market were classified as A shares.  The number of A 
shares has risen during the last decade from about 75 to 200 companies15.  The remaining (over 
5000) B shares were less well-established or less liquid securities.  In 1996, B shares were split 
into ‘B1’ and ‘B2’ to reflect the greater liquidity of the former which consisted of some 700 
shares.  In 1999, a ‘Z’ group was introduced to represent companies which have failed to 
comply fully with listing requirements, have not resolved investor complaints, or have not 
made the required arrangements for the dematerialization of their securities.  By 2003, A and 
B1 group shares represented 99% of the daily trading volumes at the BSE in terms of value, 
and consisted of 94% of the market capitalisation. 
3. Data 
The basic data for this study consist of the daily closing prices for 69 A shares and 83 B shares 
of non-financial private-sector Indian firms which were quoted continuously on the BSE from 
September 1 1993 through November 29 199616.  Table 1 describes the two samples,  which 
we refer to as the A sample and B sample respectively.  To the extent that sales are a proxy for 
size, our two samples reflect the differences between A and B stocks on the BSE.  The average 
size of a firm in the A sample is about 3 times greater than that in the B sample.  Similarly, the 
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 average firm in the A sample is nine years older than that in the B sample.  Manufacturing 
firms and business groups dominate our sample, a feature which reflects the population of 
Indian non-financial companies. 
We confined our attention to non-financial firms for two reasons.  First, we wanted to focus on 
privately-owned Indian firms.  Public sector or foreign-owned firms may not necessarily 
respond in the same way to market reforms as would private Indian firms.  A high proportion 
of Indian financial firms are wholly or partly-owned by the public sector, either by the Indian 
government or by state governments.  The remaining sample of private financial firms would 
be small and not representative of the financial sector.  A second reason for omitting financial 
firms is that insofar as financial and market reforms alter the financial structure and trading 
patterns of non-financial companies, these changes may have indirect effects on the share price 
of financial firms because of their impact on the normal lending and borrowing business of 
such firms.  These indirect effects could easily obscure the direct trading effect of market 
reforms.  These considerations suggest that Indian financial firms will not provide a good test-
bed for studying the effects of market microstructure changes, although they would 
undoubtedly be an interesting subject for study in their own right. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 1 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 1 also shows the number of firms in our samples that are included in the various market 
indices compiled by the BSE.  The BSE Sensitive Index (SENSEX), published since 1986, 
consists of 30 A shares of a selection of large and well-established companies.  It currently 
accounts for about 44% of the market value of the BSE.  The BSE100, published since 1989, is 
a more broad-based index made up of 100 A and B shares.  We used the SENSEX as the 
market index to estimate the market model for the event study.  Although it includes a 
relatively small number of shares, it accounts for a substantial part of the total market 
capitalization of the BSE, and all its component shares are heavily traded.  The components of 
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 the BSE100 include shares which are thinly traded, implying that estimation of betas for 
individual firms would be subject to a non-synchronous trading problem17.  Two broader 
indices, the BSE200 and BSE500 were introduced after the data period of our study begins (in 
1994 and 1999 respectively), and they include a yet higher proportion of thinly-traded shares. 
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 4 Introduction of the BOLT 
4.1  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)  -  Methodology 
We begin with an analysis of the impact on share returns of the introduction of the BOLT on 
March 14 1995 using event study methods.  MacKinley (1997) gives a detailed exposition.  
The basic equilibrium model of security returns is the market model: 
tktkktk MR ,, εβα ++=                     ...(1) 
where: Rk,t (= ln Pk,t  - ln Pk,t-1) is the return on stock k on day t 
  Pk,t is the closing price on stock k 
  Mt is the daily return on the market index 
  εk,t is the error with variance = σ2k. 
The estimation of (1) with daily data and its application to event studies have been widely 
discussed (Brown and Warner, 1985).  French (1980) distinguished between calendar time and 
trading time models.  In the former, returns are generated continuously implying that reported 
returns distributions will differ as among Mondays, post-holidays, and other working days.  In 
the latter, returns are generated only in trading time and return distributions are therefore the 
same on each trading day.  The trading time hypothesis is invariably rejected by the data but 
the calendar time hypothesis usually fares little better (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988).  In this 
paper, we adopt a calendar time approach implying that (1) can be rewritten as: 
tktkktk MR ,, εβα +′+=′                      ...(2) 
where:  ttktk nRR ,, =′   and  ttt nMM =′  
Now, Rk,t is the return on stock k between two consecutive days when the exchange was open 
for trading, from day t - n to day t, which include nt calendar-day returns; and Mt is the 
corresponding return on the market index.  Thus R'k,t and M't are the returns per calendar day 
during period nt on stock k and the market index respectively. 
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 To evaluate the impact of the introduction of the BOLT, the standard event study method 
involves estimating (2) outside the event window, and then calculating the abnormal return per 
calendar day (AR'k,t) in the event window as: 
)ˆˆ(,, tkktktk MRRA ′+−′=′ βα                 ...(3) 
The AR on a share for each trading day in the event window (ARk,t) is obtained by multiplying 
AR'k,t by the number of calendar-day returns between successive trading days: 
ttktk nRAAR ,, ′=                       ...(4) 
Finally, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARk,t) are calculated as: 
vTTuTtARCAR
t
uTh
htktk +−== ∑
−=
,...,,...,;,,,             ...(5) 
where:  t = (T-u,…,T,…,T+v) is the event window, and t = T is the event day.  These can then 
be averaged across shares to obtain the mean CAR for each day in the window. 
As observed by Karafiath (1988), an equivalent procedure for calculating the ARs is the event 
dummy approach.  This involves estimating: 
tk
vT
uTh
thhktkktk dMR ,,,, εγβα ++′+=′ ∑+
−=
               ...(6) 
across the non-window period and the event window itself using dh,t as daily dummies within 
the event window (dh,t = 1 for h = t and zero otherwise).  Standard theory shows that estimates 
of the market model from (6), kαˆ , are identical to those arrived at using the more usual 
method with (2).  Likewise, the estimated coefficients (
kβˆ
hk ,γˆ ) are identical to the abnormal 
returns obtained by calculating AR'k,t using (3).  See Karafiath (1988) for details.  To obtain the 
abnormal return for any period of nt calendar-day returns, we use (4) as before. 
The event dummy approach is not widely used.  However, it has the useful property that (6) 
delivers direct estimates of the significance of the ARs through the t statistics for the dummy 
variables.  It also permits the use of F tests on the estimated dummies to check the length of the 
event window.  This is particularly important in studying the impact of new technology where 
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 market participants may initially incur learning costs in the operation of the system.  The full 
impact of the new system may take some time to be reflected in share prices, and the best 
length for the event window may therefore be unclear.  Plots of the CARs give an informal 
indication of the true length of the event window, but F statistics provide a more rigorous test. 
Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997) and Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) use a 
dummy variable approach to calculate certain of their ARs.  However, they do not test the 
length of the event window as we do.  Also, they impose a particular time pattern on the ARs 
by constraining the event dummy parameters to be equal across large segments of the event 
window18.  It is hard to see the point of this, since the standard methodology does not impose 
any pattern on the ARs.  In theory, this procedure could eliminate idiosyncratic components in 
each day’s AR, but it can only do so if the imposed parameter process corresponds to the true 
underlying AR process, and there is no a priori reason to believe that this is the case.  Thus, 
their procedure is more restrictive than the standard event study method. 
Efficient and unbiased estimation of (2) or (6) in daily data is typically plagued by further 
problems, especially thin trading and non-normality of the returns distribution.  Non-trading 
was endemic in Mumbai at the time of the introduction of BOLT.  As shown in table 2, even 
the most liquid A shares in our sample did not trade on average on 23% of possible trading 
days when the BSE was open.  For the less liquid B shares the figure is even greater at 34% of 
open days.  Dimson (1979) showed that thin trading will tend to bias downwards the OLS 
estimates of βk in (2) and proposed instead estimating19: 
tk
h
hj
jtjkktk MR ,,, εβα +′+=′ ∑
−=
+                   ...(7) 
Provided non-trading is not too severe, OLS estimation of (7) will deliver unbiased estimates 
of the true systematic risk using relatively small values of h (typically 3 - 520).   The estimate of 
systematic risk is just: . ∑=
j
jkk ,ββ
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 __________________________________________________________________________  
Table 2 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Maynes and Rumsey (1993) advocate instead using trade-to-trade prices of individual stocks to 
adjust for thin trading.  The time intervals between trade-to-trade prices, like those between 
calendar time prices, vary from period to period, except that the interval (nt) between the prices 
of a security (and hence between corresponding values of Mt) is interpreted as the interval 
between consecutive days in which a trade took place in that security instead of between days 
on which the exchange is open for business.  According to Dimson (1979), there is relatively 
little difference between the Dimson and trade-to-trade methods in terms of the unbiasedness 
of the resulting estimate of βk.  In our research, we experimented with both methods, but we 
found little difference between the results in each case.  We therefore report only the results 
obtained by using the Dimson method21. 
A second problem with estimation of the market model on daily data is the possibility of non-
normality of the returns.  Mills, Coutts, and Roberts (1996) have advocated robust estimation 
methods to deal with non-trading and associated excess kurtosis of returns in the market 
model.  Cable and Holland (2000) point out that the main application of the model in event 
studies is in the calculation of ARs for a large number of stocks and subsequent averaging of 
these returns across the portfolio to evaluate the impact of the event under investigation.  They 
note that robust estimation does not necessarily lead to efficiency gains in the presence of 
skewness which is also common in security returns.  Furthermore, they show that the process 
of averaging ARs across a portfolio typically restores normality for both robust and OLS 
estimators of the underlying market model.  Since this is precisely our application of the 
model, we proceeded with OLS estimation. 
In summary therefore we conduct the event study using the market model, estimated by the 
Dimson method applied to the event dummy approach.  Thus we estimate: 
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To reduce the possibility of ex-post selection bias (Brown, Goetzmann and Ross, 1995) we 
follow Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997) who argued that the equilibrium model for 
evaluating market microstructure reforms should be estimated on data from the period after the 
reform took place.  In our study, a further reason for post-event estimation is that shares started 
trading on the NSE on November 4 1994, just before the introduction of the BOLT.  Shah and 
Thomas (1996) concluded that competition from the NSE had a negative impact on liquidity on 
the BSE.  Using pre-event data to estimate the market model for our study could therefore bias 
the CARs upwards. 
For the length of the estimation period we experimented with a 12 month period (March 1995 
to February 1996) and an 18 month period (March 1995 to August 1996).  Panel 1 of appendix 
table 1A gives details.  However, as the two periods gave very similar results, we only report 
the results for the longer estimation period of 18 months. 
We chose the event window to be t = T - 5,...,T + 50, where T is the date of the introduction of 
the BOLT (14 March 1995).  We used a 5 day window prior to the introduction of the BOLT 
as we were interested in the effect of the BOLT per se and not the effect of the announcements 
which preceded its introduction.  The 50 day post-introduction window concludes on the date 
that the transfer of stocks to the BOLT was completed.  The event window is therefore the 56 
days that the BSE was open for trading from day T-5 (7 March 1995) to T+50 (6 June 1995).  
See panel 1 of appendix table 1A. 
The length of the event window could be criticised on the grounds that all the most liquid A 
shares and many of the more liquid B shares were transferred to the BOLT on its opening 
day22.  It could thus be argued that most of the effects of the transfer would occur in the early 
part of the window.  However, a long event window should shed light on the permanency of 
the effect of automation on stock prices (Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997).  
Moreover, as we argued above, the transfer process itself could create a shadow over trading 
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 on shares which were transferred earlier to the electronic system.  Dealers would need time and 
resources to adjust to the new system and to trade with the old and new systems 
simultaneously.  These factors could affect the speed with which any gains from the new 
system were realized.  Furthermore, non-trading was endemic in Mumbai at this time and even 
the most liquid A shares did not trade on approximately 23% of possible trading days.  Thus 
we worked with the 56-day window.  However, we did test the length of the window using F 
tests on the estimated event dummies, γk,h, particularly to help determine if days towards the 
end of the post-event window should be excluded. 
4.2  Cumulative abnormal returns  -  Results and implications 
Before turning attention to the time series of average CARs over the event window, it is useful 
to examine the market model regressions that were used to generate these data (table 3).  It is 
reassuring that the mean estimate of the constant (alpha) in the market model is close to zero 
for both A and B shares.  Likewise, the mean estimates of beta are positive and not 
significantly different from unity for both A and B shares as we would expect in a large 
portfolio.  We calculated the mean of the t-statistics for alpha and beta across the market model 
regressions, but, a more precise evaluation of the significance of the coefficients can be 
achieved by testing the null that the t-statistics exceed their (5%) critical value.  This is done in 
two ways: first by a (cross-sectional) t test on the absolute values of the t-statistics themselves; 
and second by using the cumulative binomial distribution to calculate the probability that the 
absolute value of any t statistic is at-or-above the critical value, the alternative being that it is 
less than the critical value.  These tests, reported in table 3, show that the population mean of 
the alpha t-statistics (absolute value) is below the critical value, confirming that the alphas are 
not significantly different from zero.  Conversely, the mean of the beta t-statistics is well above 
the critical value.  The binomial probabilities associated with the number of t-statistics lying 
below or at-or-above the critical t value confirm these results.  Overall, these results give us 
confidence in the choice of sample and of the market index. 
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 In both samples, the mean of the F-statistics (for zero slope coefficients) is high enough to 
conclude that the true mean value of the F-statistic lies above the 5% critical value.  This 
conclusion is reinforced by the binomial probabilities associated with the number of F-
statistics that lie below or at-or-above the critical value.  The significance of the F statistics, 
including as they do the 56 event dummies, is important preliminary evidence that there were 
significant abnormal returns in the event window associated with the introduction of the 
BOLT. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 3 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Figures 1 and 2 show the average CARs obtained from the market models of table 3 and 
equation (8) for samples A and B respectively.  Overall, A and B shares both reacted positively 
to the introduction of the new trading system, but the average impact on the less liquid B 
shares was about twice as large as on the A shares. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Figures 1-2 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
On the first day of trading on the BOLT (day zero), there was an average negative abnormal 
return on both A shares and B shares.  This is not necessarily unexpected, as the change in 
trading systems from open-outcry to electronic was dramatic, particularly for such a large 
number of shares simultaneously, and it is likely that there was some uncertainty on the first 
day of trading, particularly about the possibility of technical failures associated with the new 
system.  On the first day after the event day (day one), the average A share recorded an 
abnormal return of 1.7%23.  This took the CAR for the period from 5 days before the 
introduction of BOLT through the end of day one to 2.3%.  The average CAR for the whole of 
the event window is 5%.  The price increase appears to have been permanent as the average 
CAR in the last ten days of the event period (day 41 to 50) is 4.4%.  The average B share 
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 gained an abnormal return of 1.9% on the first day after the event day24.  This rise took the 
CAR through the end of day one to 4.1%.  The average CAR for the whole of the event 
window for the B shares is more than twice that on the A shares at 10.8%.  Moreover, the 
effect on the B shares appears to have built up steadily over time, as the average CAR in the 
last ten days of the event period is 13.8%, or more than 3 times the corresponding statistic for 
A shares. 
These are dramatic figures.  For A shares they imply that the BOLT created a permanent price 
increase of about 4.5%, but for B shares the increase is around 10%.  Of course the B shares 
are a substantially lower proportion of the total market value of the BSE than the A shares.  
However, if we take the lower figure of 4.5% for all shares and apply this to the total market 
value of quoted securities on the BSE as of March 1995 (Rs4355bn), this implies a permanent 
increase in value of some Rs196bn or about 2% of India’s 1994-95 current GDP at factor cost 
(Rs9434bn).  However rough this estimate may be, on any reckoning, it represents a substantial 
increase in value25.  
To evaluate more rigorously the importance of the CARs, we extend the approach of Amihud, 
Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) and study the event window in segments.  Table 4 shows 
the results of tests on the cross-sectional significance of the CARs at 10 day intervals from 
days zero through 50.  We test significance by computing the t tests for the null hypothesis that 
the population mean of each CAR is zero. We also check for a positive abnormal return by 
comparing positive and negative CARs using the cumulative binomial26.  For the A shares, all 
but one of the CARs are statistically significant.  Likewise, with one exception, the fraction of 
positive incidents of CARs in the A shares is sufficiently high so that the null of equally 
probable positive and negative CARs is decisively rejected.  In all cases the proportion of 
positive CARs (0.58) is in excess of one-half.  For the B shares, all the CARs, t-statistics, and 
fractions of positive CARs are uniformly higher than they are for A shares.  These results 
provide solid evidence that the introduction of the BOLT had a significant positive and 
permanent effect on share values, and that the effect was particularly marked for the less liquid 
B shares. 
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 __________________________________________________________________________  
Table 4 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
The event-dummy approach permits the use of F tests on the estimated γk,h to help determine if 
groups of days at different points in the event window (particularly towards the end) should be 
excluded from the window.  The null hypothesis for the F-tests on each security is that the 
dummies are jointly not significantly different from zero.  We then compare the F-test results 
in each cross-section with the relevant critical F value, using t tests and the cumulative 
binomial.  The results are shown in table 5. 
Beginning with the A sample, the first row of table 5 shows the results of testing the joint 
significance of all 56 event dummies.  The mean F-statistic at 1.279 is smaller than the relevant 
critical value, but the difference is not large enough to reject the null that the population mean 
is equal to the critical value at which the null hypothesis of the F-test can be rejected.  We then 
tested the 49, 40, 30 and 20 dummies most distant from the event day.  In all but one case (the 
case of the twenty dummies from day 31 to day 50), the mean F statistic is lower than the 
critical F value, but the difference is never large enough to reject the null of the t-test that they 
are equal.  We next tested the joint significance of each group of ten dummies separately (i.e. 
the dummies for days: 41 to 50;  31 to 40; 21 to 30; 11 to 20 and; 1 to 10).  Excluding the most 
distant dummies (days 41 to 50), the t-tests indicate that the mean F statistics are significantly 
less than the relevant 5% critical values, implying that the effect within each 10-day period 
alone was relatively small.  Put together, these results reinforce the conclusion that the overall 
impact of the BOLT on A shares was significant, but that the impact built up slowly over an 
extended period, with the daily abnormal returns often being individually insignificant. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 5 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
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 Panel 2 of table 5 summarises the results for sample B.  Excluding four cases, for each block of 
dummies the mean F-statistic is generally above the critical value, implying rejection of the 
null that the dummies are insignificant.  In three of the remaining four cases the difference 
between the mean F statistic and the critical value is significant, implying rejection of the null 
of significance.  However, these three cases consist of the two blocks of 10 dummies furthest 
from the event day and the joint test of these 20 dummies. Consequently, these results would 
suggest that the impact of the BOLT on the B shares was significant overall, and that the most 
significant impact on the B shares occurred during the first 30 days of its introduction.   
Therefore, it appears that the BOLT generated positive and significant abnormal returns, 
particularly for the less liquid B shares.  Moreover, the impact on the B shares built up and was 
completed more rapidly than that on the A shares.  A positive price reaction would be justified 
if the move to electronic trading created improvements in at least one of the fundamental 
market attributes, such as liquidity, efficiency or price volatility (Glen, 1994).  Likewise, the 
differential reaction of A and B shares could be explainable by differential changes in any of 
these attributes.  The ways in which electronic trading may be expected to affect market 
attributes is discussed particularly in Harris (2003) and Allen, Hawkins and Sato, (2001)  In the 
next three sections we examine the changes in liquidity, efficiency, and volatility following the 
introduction of the BOLT. 
5.  Liquidity on the BSE 
Since B shares are less liquid than A shares, we begin by examining whether their stronger 
reaction could be explained by a greater improvement in liquidity following the introduction of 
BOLT.  Electronic trading can contribute to market liquidity through its impact on fairness, 
speed of execution, access and costs (Harris, 2003).  Electronic trading enhances fairness and 
execution speed because the matching and trading rules are implemented objectively and 
transparently by the system.  Manual floor trading may be subject to variations in the 
interpretation of rules, and outright cheating.  Electronic trading also removes the physical 
constraints to which floor trading is subject and gives equal access to all traders (Allen, 
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 Hawkins and Sato, 2001).  According to Shah and Thomas (1997), pre-BOLT access to the 
BSE trading floor by investors outside Mumbai was severely compromised by the need for 
additional intermediaries, poor communications, and higher transactions costs.  Following the 
introduction of BOLT, members of the exchange were permitted to open trading terminals 
within Mumbai and later also in other cities. 
Table 6 compares the average trading frequency for the sample of A shares and B shares in the 
18 months prior to the introduction of BOLT (340 trading days) with the trading frequency in 
the first 18 months of electronic trading (351 trading days).  The pre-BOLT period ends 6 
trading days before the introduction of BOLT; the post-BOLT period begins after the 50 
trading days during which the transfer of shares to the BOLT took place.  (See panel 2 of 
appendix table 1A.)  Trading frequency for a given firm is defined as the percentage of days on 
which the share traded on the BSE as a fraction of the total days that the exchange was open 
during the period.  It is taken as a proxy for liquidity because trading volumes are not available 
prior to 1995. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 6 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
The average trading frequency for A shares amounts to 75% in the pre-BOLT period and 80% 
in the post-BOLT period, a statistically significant increase.  Positive changes in trading 
frequency dominate negative changes at 49 to 14, and give a rejection of the null that negative 
and positive changes are equally likely.  The average trading frequency of B shares increases 
from 65% in the pre-BOLT period to 68% in the post-BOLT period.  Although this difference 
is statistically significant, it is not as high or as strongly significant as in the case of A shares.  
Given the stronger reaction to the BOLT that we recorded for B shares compared with A 
shares, we might have expected that it would be the B shares that would display a greater 
improvement in liquidity.  To check this point more precisely we also tested whether the 
increase in liquidity is statistically different as between A and B shares.  The results of these 
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 tests (panel 3 in table 6) show that the improvement in liquidity for A shares is also larger than 
for B shares, although the difference between A and B shares is not significant.  We also tested 
for an association between each individual firm’s listing flag (A or B) and the magnitude of the 
change in its share liquidity (the last row of table 6), but we found no evidence of such a link. 
The conclusion from the liquidity analysis is that both A and B shares display a significant 
improvement in liquidity following the transfer to electronic trading. This helps to explain the 
positive overall price reaction to the new system but it cannot explain the stronger reaction of 
the less liquid B shares.  We therefore turn next to changes in efficiency. 
6. Weak-form efficiency on the BSE 
An important aspect of electronic trading is that it promotes the rapid dissemination of 
information, particularly on trades.  Improved transparency, information flows and enhanced 
liquidity should have improved the price discovery process on the BSE in the post-BOLT 
period.  Since B shares are less heavily traded we would expect there to be less information 
available in the public domain for B shares than for A shares.  If the information content of 
prices improved following the introduction of the BOLT we would therefore expect this to be 
particularly important for B shares.  We test this hypothesis by conducting simple weak-form 
efficiency tests for A and B shares, before and after the introduction of the BOLT. 
We examine weak-form efficiency by testing for autocorrelation in the returns series using the 
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic given by: 
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τρτ                 ...(8) 
where: is the sample autocorrelation at lag τ, m is the maximum lag, T is the sample size, 
and .  See Diebold (1998) for an exposition.  The Q statistic is a portmanteau test and 
therefore has low power against alternatives which involve intermittent spikes in the 
autocorrelation function.  In general, we would not expect to encounter complex high-order 
autocorrelations in daily share returns series, and we would argue that the test is therefore 
adequate for the present purpose.  However, as a check on the robustness of the test results we 
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 computed the Q statistic for maximum lag lengths of m = 1,…,5.  This was done for A and B 
shares for the same pre-BOLT and post-BOLT periods which were used to compare the trading 
frequency.  The results are shown in table 7. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 7 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
For both A and B shares there is a decrease in the mean Q statistics as between the pre-BOLT 
and post-BOLT eras.  The decreases are mostly not significant for A shares but generally 
significant for the B.  However, for both A and B shares, the mean Q values are typically much 
larger than the medians, suggesting that the means may be driven by a few very large Q 
statistics.  We therefore focus more attention on the results of the binomial tests rather than 
those of the t tests.  The binomial test compares the number of Q values below the relevant 5% 
critical value with those which are at-or-above it.  Regardless of the maximum lag selected, or 
whether the period is the pre-BOLT or post-BOLT, the results for both A and B shares show 
that the number of Q values below the critical value is greater than (and mostly significantly 
greater than) the number which is at-or-above this value.  This suggests that, for a majority of 
our sample shares, the BSE may have been weak-form efficient both before and after the 
introduction of the BOLT. 
This conclusion does not rule out the possibility that efficiency improvements did take place.  
First, the mean and median changes in the Q values as between the pre-BOLT and post-BOLT 
periods are negative regardless of the maximum lag, suggesting an improvement in efficiency.  
Moreover, the magnitudes of the changes are larger for B shares.  In addition, the means and 
medians for the changes in Q are similar to each other suggesting that greater reliance can be 
placed on t tests.  Table 7 gives the results of t tests that the mean of the change in Q is zero, 
and binomial tests that negative and positive changes in Q are equally likely.  These give 
further evidence of improvement in efficiency for B shares but much less evidence for A 
shares.  In addition, the sample autocorrelations at lag 1 for both A and B shares are 
C:\CJG\PAPERS\Fad-dfid\mm-Bse\mm-bse-c12.doc 24
 statistically and economically significant in both the pre-BOLT and post-BOLT eras.  There is 
a decline in the autocorrelation coefficient for both A and B shares as between pre-BOLT and 
post-BOLT, but once again, the decline is larger for B shares. 
In general, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the introduction of the BOLT 
was associated with increased efficiency on the BSE, particularly, and probably mainly, for the 
less liquid B shares.  Clearly, this finding is more in line with the larger CARs found for the B 
shares. 
7. Volatility on the BSE 
The third aspect of the introduction of the BOLT is its implications for return volatility.  
Electronic trading may be expected to improve the dissemination of information, reduce the 
preponderance of uninformed investors, and thereby reduce volatility in returns (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988).  However, volatility is also related to other aspects of market microstructure.  
Easley and O’Hara (1991) showed that, in a pure dealer market, prices are likely to be less 
volatile than in a market where dealers co-exist with a public order book.  As noted in section 
2, implementation of the BOLT included the introduction of an order book alongside dealers in 
the BSE.  Thus, price volatility might be expected to increase as a result.  In addition, there are 
theoretical and empirical relationships between volume and volatility.  See Karpoff (1987) for 
a survey of this literature.  Perhaps the most well-documented empirical regularity is that of a 
positive correlation between volume and volatility (for example, Bessembinder and Seguin, 
1993).  Thus, increased volume, associated with the increased liquidity we have documented 
following the introduction of the BOLT, might be expected to increase price volatility.  In 
short, even if electronic trading per se reduces volatility, other effects of electronic trading may 
produce a net increase in volatility.  Clearly though, if volatility did decrease following the 
move to the BOLT, given that we have already established that liquidity and efficiency 
increased, this would be a further and strong indication that it was the move to electronic 
trading per se which reduced volatility. 
C:\CJG\PAPERS\Fad-dfid\mm-Bse\mm-bse-c12.doc 25
 We base our study of volatility on the beta coefficients and standard deviations of returns on A 
and B shares.  As a measure of volatility, beta has the advantage that, in theory, it represents 
the systematic part of a firm’s risk which is priced by the market.  In addition, individual firm 
betas necessarily share the same unit of measurement and, in a large portfolio have a mean 
close to unity.  The pre-BOLT and post-BOLT periods are defined as for the liquidity and 
efficiency tests (panel 2 of appendix table 1A).  For the pre-BOLT era, we estimated the 
market model using (7) from September 1 1993 through day T-6 prior to the introduction of the 
BOLT.  Likewise, the post-BOLT estimates are those obtained by applying (7) to the period 
from day T+51 relative to the introduction of the BOLT through November 29 1996.  We then 
compared pre- and post-BOLT estimates of the mean and variance of the betas.  Deviations 
from unity of the mean of the betas are best regarded as sampling variation, and we compared 
the means mainly as a check on this point.  To assess the change in volatility, we compare the 
standard deviation of beta before and after the BOLT.  Given the evidence that the market 
model is an incomplete model of security risks (for example, Fama, 1991), we also examined 
changes in the total risk measured by the standard deviations of share returns over the same 
periods. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 8 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
We see from table 8 that the standard deviation of the betas for the A shares fell, as we would 
expect, but it increased for the B shares.  Moreover, the median change in the standard 
deviation was positive for both A and B shares.  In contrast, both A and B shares exhibited a 
significant decrease in mean total risk as between the pre- and post-BOLT eras.  Thus, the 
evidence on volatility is inconclusive; it increased on some measures but decreased on others. 
8. Summarising the effects of liquidity, efficiency and volatility improvements 
A weakness of the standard event study method, particularly applied to market microstructure 
reforms, is that we can only identify mean/median liquidity, efficiency and volatility (hereafter: 
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 LEV) improvements and mean/median CARs for the sample of firms as a whole.  The evidence 
that these were the improvements that contributed to the positive CARs is, we believe, 
persuasive, but nonetheless essentially circumstantial.  The attribution of different CARs for A 
and B shares to differential LEV improvements is likewise circumstantial.  In this section, we 
aim to strengthen the evidence by testing directly the association between the CARs and the 
estimated changes in LEV.  We do this by modelling the CAR for each firm as a function of 
the (firm-specific) factors which we hypothesize would generate a positive CAR, ie: the 
changes in our chosen LEV measures.  This final test is important in the context of India where 
several changes in financial markets were occurring over the period within which we 
conducted our study.  However, few microstructure reforms take place in isolation, and we 
would argue that all event-study based evaluations of microstructure reforms should include a 
cross-sectional test of this kind. 
Specifically, we estimate the cross-section regression: 
kkkkkk PQiDQiPTFDTFCAR 2121 γγββα ++++=              
kkkkk PSDDSDPBETADBETA εθθδδ +++++ 2121       ...(9) 
where: CARk is the CAR on the kth stock through day 50 
   TFk is the trading frequency 
   Qik is Ljung-Box Q statistic for i lags 
   BETAk is the estimated beta coefficient 
   SDk is the standard deviation of returns 
and  εk is the regression error. 
Variables prefixed by D give the change between the pre-BOLT and post-BOLT era (panel 2, 
appendix table 1A).  If LEV improvements were responsible for the CARs, we would expect 
the regression coefficients to have the following signs: β1 > 0, γ1 < 0, δ1 < 0, θ1 < 0.  Otherwise, 
the joint occurrence of positive mean CARs and mean LEV improvements would be 
coincidental, and not related to one another as we believe. 
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 Variables prefixed by P give the level of liquidity, efficiency or volatility in the pre-BOLT era.  
To understand the rationale for these variables, consider as an example, firms with low 
liquidity before the introduction of the BOLT.  Illiquid shares would not normally be tracked 
by brokers.  Following the introduction of the BOLT, there are two possibilities.  The first is 
that trading increases sufficiently so that brokers now find it worthwhile to track the stocks, 
and this creates a secondary improvement in liquidity, implying β2 > 0.  Alternatively, the 
increase in trading may not be sufficient to induce brokers to track the stocks, and the 
secondary change in liquidity is therefore small or negative, implying β2 ≤ 0.  In general 
therefore, the signs of β2, γ2, δ2, and θ2 will depend on the sizes and signs of these secondary 
effects in the cross-section.  In short, we hypothesize that it is LEV changes which explain the 
cross-sectional distribution of CARs, but that these changes may be augmented by secondary 
effects which are related to (and proxied in the regression by) the initial conditions for each 
firm.  The P___ variables model these initial conditions.   
The LEV measures we use are those already reported.  For the Ljung-Box statistic we ran 
separate regressions with the lag length (i) varying from 1 to 5.  The results for each (available 
from the authors) were qualitatively similar and we therefore report only the result using 5 lags 
(Q5).  We included two distinct measures of risk, as beta and the standard deviation correspond 
to two different concepts.  Equation (9) was estimated on the entire cross-section including A 
and B shares.  The hypothesis is that differences in the CARs for A and B shares can be 
explained by different LEV improvements as between individual shares in each class of share, 
and not by a different marginal response to the same improvements.  We test this hypothesis by 
reporting the standard Chow test, splitting the sample as between A and B shares. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 9 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
The results are given in table 9 and show that a moderate proportion (about 18%) of the cross-
sectional variation in the CARs can be attributed to variations in LEV.  The F-test results show 
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 that this proportion is nevertheless clearly significant.  However, since LEV improvements are 
the identified sources of the added value in the BOLT, it would seem reasonable to argue that 
our initial estimate of added value, based on the CARs alone (section 4.2), should be scaled 
back.  Using the correlation coefficient this would put a more conservative value on the BOLT 
of 0.18×Rs196bn or about 0.4% of India’s 1994-95 GDP.  Coefficients for the changes in 
liquidity, efficiency, and beta-volatility all have the correct sign, although efficiency is not 
significant.  The change in total risk is also significant but with a positive sign.  This is 
consistent with our argument (section 7) that trading improvements may be associated with 
increased volatility.  Two of the variables measuring initial conditions are significant, and 
these too are reasonably signed: for example, higher initial liquidity creates a positive 
secondary effect. 
The regression results show that it may be necessary to distinguish among different types of 
risk.  Most importantly however, they underline the need to examine the cross-sectional 
relationships among CARs and the variables which are thought to determine them.  We saw 
that positive CARs were accompanied by (broadly) positive median changes in beta and 
negative median changes in total risk.  However, the regression shows that the CARs were 
inversely related to changes in beta and positively related to changes in total risk.  Since the 
regression identifies the cross-sectional relationships, we regard the regression results as giving 
the more reliable estimates of the signs of these relationships.  Finally, the Chow test 
decisively rejects the hypothesis that the sample should be split between A and B shares.  This 
provides firm evidence for our hypothesis that variations among the CARs of individual A and 
B shares are, in part, attributable to corresponding variations in LEV improvements for these 
shares. 
9. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to assess the improvement in functioning of the Indian capital 
market following the implementation of new technology and automation of the trading system.  
We did this by separately comparing its impact on the most liquid and a sample of less liquid 
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 shares.  We found that the impact of the BOLT measured by the CARs over a 56-day event 
window was substantial: the average CAR for the most liquid A shares was about 4.5%-5.0%, 
while that for the less liquid B shares was about twice as much, at around 10%.  The sample 
comprises a substantial proportion of the market capitalization of the BSE.  Taking the 
conservative figure of 4.5% for the whole market, and using only the explainable part of the 
CARs, the estimated impact of the BOLT was equivalent to at least 0.4% of India’s GDP: a 
moderate but important gain. 
In the second part of the paper, we sought a more detailed explanation for the CARs in terms of 
improvements in liquidity, efficiency, and volatility (LEV) accompanying the BOLT.  We 
found that the liquidity of A and B shares increased, but the improvement was greater for A 
shares.  There were also efficiency improvements in A and B shares, but here the improvement 
was substantially greater for the less liquid B shares.  For volatility we found a decline in beta-
risk but an increase in total risk, a result which is consistent with other literature suggesting the 
possibility of a positive correlation between volatility and the effects of trading improvements.  
Regression analysis provided additional evidence that the CARs could be explained by cross-
sectional variations in firm-specific LEV improvements.  Overall, the results are consistent 
with the view that the introduction of the BOLT improved the BSE’s market microstructure for 
both A and B shares, with the effect on B shares being somewhat more marked. 
Our conclusion is that improvements in trading arrangements can have significant value where 
the market is established but currently has inadequate trading arrangements.  An important 
topic of further research is to establish if these conclusions carry over into developing 
countries in which the market is less well-established and a major goal of reform is to increase 
the number of firms using the market as well as the participation of existing firms. 
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 Table 1.  Data description 
 
 No. of firms  Membership in leading indices1 
  BSE500 BSE200 BSE100 SENSEX 
Sample A 69 67 (97%) 58 (84%) 43 (62%) 15 (22%) 
Sample B 83 83 (100%) 12 (14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 Year of incorporation Sales 1995 (crore Indian rupees2) 
 Oldest Average Youngest Minimum Average Maximu
m 
Sample A 1879 1956 1989 21.62 950.51 7019.05 
Sample B 1863 1965 1989 0.51 332.78 1266.09 
 Industry1 Ownership1,3  
 Manufacturing Non-financial 
services 
Indian Business 
Groups  
Independent 
Indian 
Sample A 64 (93%) 5 (7%) 67 (97%) 2 (3%) 
Sample B 74 (89%) 9 (11%) 77 (93%) 6 (7%) 
 
NOTES: 
(1) The percentages are of the total number of firms in the respective sample.  
(2) Crore=107 (i.e. 10 million) 
(3) Ownership group is based on the PROWESS classification.  This classifies a company under the ownership 
group with which it is most closely associated.  See Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (1997). 
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 Table 2.  Trading on the BSE – September 1993 to August 1996 
 
 1993-41 1994-51 1995-61 1993-4 to 1995-6 
Panel 1.  Number of weekdays the BSE was open for trading 
Total weekdays 261 261 261 783 
Closed days2 39 32 22 93 
Open days 
(fraction of total weekdays) 
222 
(0.85) 
229 
(0.88) 
239 
(0.92) 
690 
(0.88) 
Panel 2.  Descriptive statistics for number of trading days of 69 A stocks3 
Average 
(fraction of open days) 
171.921 
(0.77) 
165.471 
(0.72) 
189.942 
(0.79) 
529.889 
(0.77) 
Std Deviation 16.958 24.790 21.148 53.544 
Minimum 133 76 121 348 
Median 172 167 192 528 
Maximum 207 212 227 639 
Panel 3.  Descriptive statistics for number of trading days of 83 B stocks 
Average 
(fraction of open days) 
149.470 
(0.67) 
143.349 
(0.63) 
163.337 
(0.68) 
456.157 
(0.66) 
Std Deviation 23.264 31.115 30.376 67.751 
Minimum 87 28 61 249 
Median 154 153 167 474 
Maximum 194 188 209 568 
 
NOTES 
(1) The years run from 1 September to 31 August. 
(2) Closed days include weekdays when the BSE was closed due to holidays, strikes, payment crises, technical 
breakdowns etc. 
(3) For six A firms no pricing data is available for at least part of the 1993-4 year. For one of those firms no 
pricing data is available also for the early part of the 1994-5 year.  These firms are therefore excluded from 
the statistics relating to 1993-4, 1994-5 and to the whole period 1993-4 to 1995-6. Hence in Panel 2 the 
number of observations for 1993-4 and for the full period is 63, while that for 1994-5 is 68. 
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 Table 3.  Regression diagnostics for the market model, event dummy method 
 
Parameter Mean Median Std. Dev. t-test on the mean of t-
statistic1:  |µ| = Z5% 
Binomial:2 
( ) %5%5 : zz ≥<
Panel 1.  Sample of 69 A shares  (350 obs) 
kαˆ  -0.001 -0.001 0.002   
αˆt  -0.661 -0.723 1.424 -7.631*** 53:16 
kβˆ  0.892 0.866 0.361   
βˆt  3.766 3.574 1.722 8.670*** 9:60*** 
2R  0.364 0.351 0.140   
F 2.838 2.273 2.072 5.963*** 12:57*** 
Panel 2.  Sample of 83 B shares  (350 obs) 
kαˆ  -0.002 -0.002 0.002   
αˆt  -1.455 -1.552 1.040 -4.503*** 60:23 
kβˆ  0.915 0.839 0.726   
βˆt  2.668 2.663 1.223 5.211*** 26:57*** 
2R  0.308 0.298 0.144   
F 2.207 1.787 1.696 4.602*** 32:51** 
 
NOTES 
(1) t-test on the mean of t-statistic:  |µ| = Z5% - To construct the cross-section t tests we compare the firm-specific 
estimates of tα tβ and F from the market model with their respective 5% critical values.  The null and 
alternative hypotheses are: H %50 |:| z=µ , %5|:| zH ≠µα . Interpretation of the alternative hypothesis 
depends on the tail at which the t statistic falls: 
If t > 0: implies: %5|| z>µ  or that the t-test/F-test for insignificance can be rejected at above 5% level 
If t < 0: implies: %5|| z<µ  or that the t-test/F-test for insignificance can not be rejected at 5% level 
where: µ = mean tα tβ or F value from the market model 
z5% is the relevant 5% critical value of tα tβ or F for the corresponding regression. 
The critical values (z5%) refer to a two-tailed t distribution in the case of α and β, or an F distribution.  The 
critical values against which the means are compared are as follows: 
 
 Degrees of Freedom Critical value Area 
t 350-68=282 1.9684 2 tail: 0.05 
F DF1=282; DF2=67 1.3498 Upper tail: 0.05 
 
(2) Binomial: ( < ) - For the binomial test, (x:y) gives the number of observations for which the 
absolute value of the t statistic or F statistic is less than (x) or greater than or equal to (y) the relevant critical 
value given in note 1.  The null hypothesis is that |
%5%5 : zz ≥
%5| z<µ   and | %5| z≥µ  are equally likely.  Based on the 
cumulative binomial probability (Г) of observing (x:y), the stars show the significance levels associated with 
rejecting the null in favour of the hypothesis that observing  | %5z|≥µ is significantly greater than 50%. 
(3) Significance levels are: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
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Figure 1. Mumbai stock exchange: CARs: 69 A stocks
Dummy variable estimation
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NOTES:  
(1) Cumulative abnormal returns for 69 A stocks of non-financial private sector Indian firms that are listed on the BSE. On 14 March 1995 (day 0), these stocks were shifted 
from open outcry to fully automated trading system, called BOLT.  
(2) The event window is the period from 5 open days (i.e. days when the BSE was open for trading) before the BOLT introduction day, to 50 open days following the 
introduction. (day -5 to day +50 relative to the event day). 
(3) The market model with 5 leads, 5 lags and 56 event dummies is used to estimate the abnormal returns.  350 daily returns are used for the estimation.   These returns are 
from a period that includes the event period, commencing on day -5 relevant to the event day (7.3.1995) and ending on day +344 (30.8.1996). 
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Figure 2. Mumbai stock exchange: CARs: 83 B stocks.
Dummy variable estimation
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NOTES:  
(1) Cumulative abnormal returns for 83 B stocks of non-financial private sector Indian firms that are listed on the BSE. On 14 March 1995 (day 0), these stocks were shifted 
from open outcry to fully automated trading system, called BOLT.  
(2) The event window is the period from 5 open days (i.e. days when the BSE was open for trading) before the BOLT introduction day, to 50 open days following the 
introduction. (day -5 to day +50 relative to the event day). 
(3) The market model with 5 leads, 5 lags and 56 event dummies is used to estimate the abnormal returns.  350 daily returns are used for the estimation.   These returns are 
from a period that includes the event period, commencing on day -5 relevant to the event day (7.3.1995) and ending on day +344 (30.8.1996). 
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Table 4.  Tests of the CARs: Event dummy estimation 
 
 Panel 1.  69 A stocks Panel 2.  83 B stocks 
 Mean Med. Std. Dev. t-test:  
µ = 0 
Binomial: 
(+ : -) 
Mean Med. Std. Dev. t-test:  
µ = 0 
Binomial:  
(+ : -) 
CAR0 0.006          0.006 0.048 1.086 40:29 0.022 0.018 0.059 3.343*** 56:27***
CAR10 0.062          0.060 0.094 5.463*** 50:19*** 0.124 0.122 0.130 8.646*** 76:7***
CAR20 0.061          0.057 0.110 4.589*** 48:21*** 0.108 0.106 0.141 6.985*** 64:19***
CAR30 0.067          0.044 0.131 4.214*** 44:25** 0.143 0.128 0.194 6.726*** 64:19***
CAR40 0.048          0.048 0.143 2.808*** 41:28* 0.126 0.135 0.197 5.801*** 58:25***
CAR50 0.047          0.033 0.168 2.319** 42:27* 0.138 0.109 0.216 5.806*** 61:22***
 
NOTES: 
(1) t test: µ = 0 -  t-statistic associated with the mean CARu. t-stat =  E(CARu) N1/2 / Std Dev (CARu).  The null and alternative hypotheses are: 0:0 =µH , 0: ≠µαH ,  where:
  µ= mean CARu  
(2) Binomial: (+ : -) - For the binomial test, (x:y) gives the number of observations for which CARk,u is positive (x) or negative (y).  The null hypothesis is that positive and 
negative observations are equally likely.  Based on the cumulative binomial probability (Г) of observing (x:y), the stars show the significance levels associated with 
rejecting the null in favour of the hypothesis that observing a positive CARk,u  is significantly greater than 50%. 
(3) Significance levels are: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.  (For the t-tests these are based on the two-tail area associated with the t-statistic.) 
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Table 5.  Descriptive statistics and tests of the F-statistics for the event dummies. 
 
F-tests   Panel 1.  69 A stocks Panel 2.  83 B stocks 
Hypothesis  F F5%1 Mean Med. Std. 
Dev.
t-test2:  
µ =F5% 
Binomial:3
%5%5 : FF ≥<
Mean Med. Std. 
Dev.
t-test2:  
µ =F5% 
Binomial:3 
: FF ≥ %5%5<  
Ho : γ-5 = γ-4 =….. γ50 =0 
all 56 dummies: –5 to 50,insignificant F56,282     1.377 1.279 1.098 0.791 -1.031 45:24 1.737 1.341 1.682 1.950*** 43:40***
Ho : γ2 = γ3 =….. γ50 =0 
49 dummies: 2 to 50, insignificant F49,282     1.400 1.231 1.053 0.840 -1.662 48:21 1.696 1.241 1.568 1.724* 46:37
Ho : γ11 = γ12 =….. γ50 =0 
40 dummies: 11 to 50, insignificant F40,282     1.437 1.252 1.009 0.948 -1.628 52:17 1.614 1.230 1.512 1.066 50:33
Ho : γ21 = γ22 =….. γ50 =0 
30 dummies: 21 to 50, insignificant F30,282     1.500 1.337 0.976 1.244 -1.086 49:20 1.543 1.048 1.453 0.270 51:32
Ho : γ31 = γ32 =….. γ50 =0 
20 dummies: 31 to 50, insignificant F20,282     1.608 1.261 0.874 1.512 -1.908* 57:12 1.328 0.914 1.448 -1.762* 60:23
Ho : γ41 = γ42 =….. γ50 =0 
10 dummies: 41 to 50, insignificant F10,282     1.864 1.524 0.866 2.842 -0.995 58:11 1.433 0.681 2.188 -1.796* 67:16
Ho : γ31 = γ32 =….. γ40 =0 
10 dummies: 31 to 40, insignificant F10,282    1.864 0.997 0.689 0.933 -7.718*** 60:9 1.219 0.829 1.270 -4.627*** 68:15
Ho : γ21 = γ22 =….. γ30 =0 
10 dummies: 21 to 30, insignificant F10,282     1.864 1.495 1.069 1.414 -2.173** 51:18 1.983 1.072 2.497 0.432 56:27
Ho : γ11 = γ12 =….. γ20 =0 
10 dummies: 11 to 20, insignificant F10,282     1.864 0.999 0.626 1.092 -6.582*** 58:11 1.825 0.795 3.444 -0.104 58:25
Ho : γ1 = γ2 =….. γ10 =0 
10 dummies: 1 to 10, insignificant F10,282     1.864 1.262 0.776 1.217 -4.111*** 52:17 2.122 1.065 3.077 0.764 55:28
NOTES:  
(1) F5%  is the critical value of the relevant F statistic at the 5% level. 
(2) t test: µ =F5%  To construct the cross-section t tests we compare the firm-specific estimates of F with their respective 5% critical values. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are: : zH = %50 µ , : zH ≠ %5µα . Interpretation of the alternative hypothesis depends on the tail at which the t  statistic falls: 
If t > 0:  implies: %5z>µ  or that the F-test that the dummies are jointly insignificant can be rejected at above 5% level 
If t < 0:  implies: %5z<µ  or that the F-test that the dummies are jointly insignificant can not be rejected at 5% level 
Where µ is the F value and F(5%) is the relevant 5% critical value of F for the corresponding regression. 
: FF ≥<(3) Binomial: ( %5%5 ) - For the binomial test, (x:y) gives the number of observations for which the F statistic is less than (x) or greater than or equal to (y) the 
relevant critical value given in column 3.  The null hypothesis is that %5z<µ  and %5z≥µ  are equally likely.  Based on the cumulative binomial probability of observing 
(x:y), the stars show the significance levels associated with rejecting the null in favour of the hypothesis that observing %5z≥µ  is significantly greater than 50%. 
(4) Significance levels are: ***1%, **5%, *10%.  (For the t-tests these are based on the two-tail area associated with the t-statistic.) 
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Table 6.  Trading frequency 
 
 Panel 1.  63 A stocks (1) Panel 2.  83 B stocks 
 Mean      Median Std Dev Min Max Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Trading days: pre-BOLT (2)           253 251 26.918 170 312 220 229 32.722 124 282
Trading frequency: pre-BOLT (TFpre) (3)         0.745 0.738 0.079 0.500 0.918 0.647 0.674 0.096 0.365 0.829
Trading days: post-BOLT(2) 279       283 31.415 170 330 238 247 45.878 86 304
Trading frequency: post-BOLT (TFpost) (3)         0.795 0.806 0.090 0.484 0.940 0.677 0.704 0.131 0.245 0.866
Change in trading frequency (DTF) (4)        0.050 0.057 0.073 -0.160 0.242 0.031 0.052 0.127 -0.352 0.365
t test on mean change(5): µ = 0  5.393***     2.195**     
Binomial on change(6) (+ : -)  49:14***     56:27***     
 Panel 3.  Comparison of the change in trading frequency of A stocks versus B stocks 
Test   Null  Alternative Test statistics
F(83-1), (63-1) (7) σ2A = σ2B =σ2 σ2A < σ2B 3.042*** 
T(63 + 83 –2) (8) µA = µB (assuming σ2A = σ2B) µA <> µB  1.077
T(136) (9) µA = µB (assuming σ2A < σ2B) µA <> µB  1.155
χ2(2) (10) Listing flag & size of change are not associated Listing flag & size of change are associated 0.028 
NOTES:  
(1) Six firms were excluded from sample A due to there being no pricing data in the early part of the pre-BOLT period.  
(2) Trading days for firm k is the number of days in which there was a trade in the firm’s shares on the BSE.  
(3) Trading frequency is the number of trading days as a proportion of the number of days that the BSE was open during the period.  Pre-BOLT period includes 340 open 
days, while post-BOLT includes 351 open days.  Panel 2 of table 1A in the appendix gives details for each period.  
(4) The change in the trading frequency of firm k, is calculated as the difference between the stock’s trading frequency: DTFk= TFpost,k – TFpre,k.   
:H(5) The t test is a test of the null hypothesis that there is no improvement in the trading frequency.  The null and alternative hypotheses are: 00 =µ ,     0: >µαH ,  where: 
µ= mean DTF.  The test is of the form: t-stat = E(DTFk) N1/2 / Std Dev (DTFk). The stars indicate the significance level associated with a one-tailed test.  
(6) For the binomial, (x:y)  shows positive (x) and negative (y) changes in trading frequency. The null hypothesis is that positive and negative changes are equally likely.  
Based on the cumulative binomial, the stars indicate the significance level of rejecting the null in favour of the alternative that the change is positive.  
(7) The F test is of the form: F-stat = σ2B/σ2A ~ F(NB-1,NA-1), where σ2B and σ2A are the respective variances of the A and B samples.  
)(8) The t test is of the form: ½2 ]/[(/)( BABABANN NNNNSXXt BA +−=−+ .  The pooled variance is: .   )2/(])1()1[( 222 −+−+−= BABBAA NNSNSNS
(9) The t-test is of the form: ½22
.. )///()( BBAABAFD NSNSXXt +−= . 
(10) The χ2 test is the median test calculated by classifying all scores as being above or at-or-below the median of the combined sample.  (These form the contingency table’s 
columns). The table is further classified as belonging to sample A or B. (These form the contingency table’s rows). The test takes the following form: ∑ −= EEO /)( 222χ  
where O is the observed value and E is the expected value of each cell and is given by its row total times its column total divided by the number of total observations. 
(11) Significance levels are: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 7.1  Efficiency improvements - Return predictability for A shares before and after the BOLT 
 
Panel 1.  63 A stocks 
| χ25%  Mean Median  Std
Dev 
t-test  
on Q:  µ = χ25% 
on change:  µ =0 
Binomial 
2 : χχ ≥<Q:( ) 2%5%5
change: (- : +) 
|ρ(1)|       
Pre-BOLT    0.105*** 0.089 0.069   
Post-BOLT     0.088*** 0.073 0.069   
QLB  Max lag =1       
Pre-BOLT   3.841 5.393 2.730 7.039 1.749* 36:27 
Post-BOLT    3.841 4.386 1.880 5.965 0.724 42:21*** 
Change in Q  -1.007 -0.940 8.033 -0.995 40:23** 
QLB  Max lag =2       
Pre-BOLT   5.991 6.735 3.980 7.433 0.794 38:25* 
Post-BOLT    5.991 6.006 3.640 6.651 0.017 42:21*** 
Change in Q  -0.729 -0.687 8.730 -0.663 37:26 
QLB  Max lag =3       
Pre-BOLT   7.815 7.996 5.460 7.906 0.182 39:24** 
Post-BOLT    7.815 6.932 4.430 6.944 -1.009 46:17*** 
Change in Q  -1.064 -0.930 9.049 -0.933 38:25* 
QLB  Max lag =4       
Pre-BOLT   9.488 9.424 7.110 8.534 -0.059 40:23** 
Post-BOLT    9.488 8.379 6.290 7.552 -1.165 44:19*** 
Change in Q  -1.045 -1.110 9.713 -0.854 37:26 
QLB  Max lag =5       
Pre-BOLT   11.070 11.108 9.990 9.750 0.030 35:28 
Post-BOLT    11.070 9.928 7.730 8.520 -1.064 45:18*** 
Change in Q  -1.180 -0.700 11.301 -0.828 34:29 
       NOTES to table 7 follow panel 2 
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Table 7.2  Efficiency improvements - Return predictability for B shares before and after the BOLT 
 
Panel 2.  83 B stocks 
 χ25%  Mean Median  Std
Dev 
t-test  
on Q:  µ = χ25% 
on change:  µ =0 
Binomial 
2 : χχ ≥<Q:( ) 2%5%5
change: (- : +) 
|ρ(1)|       
Pre-BOLT    0.100*** 0.088 0.081   
Post-BOLT     0.074*** 0.065 0.050   
QLB  Max lag =1       
Pre-BOLT   3.841 5.642 2.670 8.569 1.914* 50:33** 
Post-BOLT    3.841 2.817 1.510 3.444 -2.711*** 63:20*** 
Change in Q  -2.825 -0.149 9.495 -2.711*** 44:39 
QLB  Max lag =2       
Pre-BOLT   5.991 7.375 4.570 8.752 1.440 50:33** 
Post-BOLT    5.991 4.163 2.700 4.308 -3.867*** 63:20*** 
Change in Q  -3.212 -1.188 10.221 -2.863*** 52:31** 
QLB  Max lag =3       
Pre-BOLT   7.815 8.706 5.540 9.015 0.901 49:34* 
Post-BOLT    7.815 5.184 3.890 4.460 -5.374*** 62:21*** 
Change in Q  -3.522 -2.230 10.400 -3.085*** 55:28*** 
QLB  Max lag =4       
Pre-BOLT   9.488 9.917 7.450 9.218 0.425 49:34* 
Post-BOLT    9.488 6.518 5.530 5.113 -5.292*** 65:18*** 
Change in Q  -3.399 -2.470 10.881 -2.846*** 56:27*** 
QLB  Max lag =5       
Pre-BOLT   11.070 11.847 9.290 9.470 0.747 47:36 
Post-BOLT    11.070 7.813 7.130 5.249 -5.653*** 65:18*** 
Change in Q  -4.034 -3.790 11.071 -3.319*** 56:27*** 
       NOTES to table 7 follow this panel 
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Table 7.3  Efficiency improvements – Notes to table 7 
 
NOTES: 
(1) Six firms were excluded from the sample of 69 A firms. This is due to missing pricing data for part of the first period. 
(2) |ρ(1)| - The absolute value of the autocorrelation at lag 1.  The stars indicate significance of the t-test. 
(3) The Pre-BOLT period includes 340 open days, while the post-BOLT includes 351 open days. Panel 2 of table 1A in the appendix gives details for each period. 
m
(4) QLB - The Ljung-Box Q-statistic defined as: ; where T is the number of daily returns, ρ∑
=
−+=LB TTTQ
1
2 )/()()2(
τ
ττρ 2(τ) is the autocorrelation at lag τ, and m is the 
maximum lag. Under the null hypothesis that the time series of returns is white noise, QLB  is distributed as χ2m.  The change is defined as: dQLB = QLB post-BOLT  - QLB pre-
BOLT. 
(5) t-test on QLB – The t test on the mean QLB is defined as :  )//()( 2%5 Tt σχµ −=  with degrees of freedom 62 (A) or 82 (B). The critical value for the appropriate χ2 
with which the mean QLB is compared is given in the χ2(5%) column.  The null and alternative hypotheses are: , . Interpretation of the alternative 
hypothesis depends on the tail at which the t  statistic falls: 
2χµ >
2
%50 : χµ =H 2%5: χµ ≠AH
 If t > 0:  implies:  or that we reject efficiency at above the 5% level %5
 If t < 0:  implies:  or that we cannot reject efficiency  2%5χµ <
(6) t-test on the change in QLB – The t test is defined as: t = µ N1/2 / Std Dev (µ).  The null and alternative hypotheses are: 0:0 =µH , 0: ≠µαH ,  where:  µ= mean value, 
and N=number of observations 
(7) Binomial test on QLB - For the binomial test, (x:y) gives the number of observations for which QLB is less than (x) or greater than or equal to (y) the relevant critical 
value.  The null hypothesis is that 2χµ < %5   and 2χµ ≥  are equally likely.  Based on the cumulative binomial probability (Г) of observing (x:y), the stars show the 
significance levels associated with rejecting the null in favour of the hypothesis that observing  is significantly greater than 50%. 
%5
2
%5χµ <
(8) Binomial the change in QLB - the binomial, (x:y) are the negative (x) and negative/zero (y) changes in QLB. The null hypothesis is that negative or negative/zero changes 
are equally likely. Based on the cumulative binomial, the stars indicate the significance level of rejecting the null in favour of the alternative that the change is negative. 
(9) Significance levels are: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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Table 8.  Volatility before and after the BOLT 
 
 Panel 1. Systematic risk: beta 
 63 A stocks 83 B stocks 
 Mean Med Std Dev Min Max Mean Med Std Dev Min Max 
Pre-BOLT   0.834 0.3330.870 -0.182 1.476 0.834 0.736 0.401 0.019 2.480
Post-BOLT   0.898 0.2920.938 0.086 1.513 0.819 0.814 0.547 0.124 4.820
F test for Equality of Variances:  
A: 22 SSF =62,62 postpre  B: 2282,82 prepost SSF =           1.302 1.866***
Change (Post – Pre) 0.065 0.069 0.338 -0.668 0.835 -0.014 -0.035 0.548 -1.278 2.966 
Binomial on change (+ : -)  34:29     40:43     
 Panel 2.  Total risk: std. dev. of returns 
 63 A stocks 83 B stocks 
 Mean       Med  Std Dev Min Max Mean Med Std Dev Min Max
Pre-BOLT           0.027 0.025 0.010 0.013 0.058 0.035 0.033 0.015 0.014 0.143
Post-BOLT           0.022 0.020 0.006 0.012 0.045 0.028 0.026 0.013 0.015 0.133
Change (Post – Pre) -0.005 -0.004 0.010 -0.040 0.019 -0.007 -0.008 0.019 -0.105 0.091 
t test on mean change: µ = 0  -4.418***     -3.608***     
Binomial on change (+ : -)  15:48***     21:62***     
NOTES to Table 8:  
(1) Six firms were excluded from sample A due to there being no pricing data in the early part of the pre-BOLT period.  
(2) Beta is the beta estimate from the market model with five leads and five lags as specified in equation (3).  In the A sample there is one firm  with a negative beta estimate. 
The change in beta is defined as: BETAchange = BETApost-BOLT - BETApre-BOLT 
(3) Std. dev. of returns is the standard deviation of daily returns in the period.  The change in std. dev. is defined as:  StdDevchange = StdDevpost-BOLT - StdDevpre-BOLT 
(4) Pre-BOLT period includes 340 open days, while post-BOLT includes 351 open days. Panel 2 of table 1A in the appendix gives details for each period.  
(5) The F test in panel 1 is a test of the null hypothesis that there is no reduction in volatility as measured by the variance of beta. 
(6) For the binomial, (x:y) shows positive (x) and negative (y) changes in volatility. The null hypothesis is that positive and negative changes are equally likely.  Based on the 
cumulative binomial, the stars indicate the significance level of rejecting the null in favour of the alternative that the change is negative.  
(7) The t test in panel 2 is a test of the null hypothesis that there is no reduction in volatility as measured by total risk.  The null and alternative hypotheses are: 0:0 =µH ,     
0: ≠µαH ,  where: µ= mean change in total risk. The test is of the form: t-stat = E(change) N1/2 / Std Dev (change). The stars indicate the significance level associated 
with a two-tailed test. 
(8)  Significance levels are: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
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 Table 9.  The contributions of liquidity, efficiency and volatility to the price reaction to BOLT 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Constant -0.3011 -0.2913 
 (2.13) (2.11) 
DTF 0.2664 0.2313 
 (1.90) (1.73) 
PTF 0.2867 0.2403 
 (1.72) (1.59) 
DQ5 -0.001465 -0.001171 
 (0.59) (0.74) 
PQ5 -0.0006577  
 (0.22)  
DBETA -0.1066 -0.08689 
 (1.96) (2.08) 
PBETA -0.03868  
 (0.60)  
DSD 9.8505 9.2226 
 (3.92) (3.61) 
PSD 9.2251 8.5917 
 (4.00) (3.67) 
R2 0.1825 0.1798 
LMHET: χ25%(1) = 3.84 0.1723 0.3482 
CHOW 1.4051 F(9,128) = 1.95 
1.7634 
F(7,132) = 2.08 
F (zero slopes) 3.8221*** F(9,137) = 1.95 
5.0800*** 
F(7,139) = 2.08 
No. of firms 146 146 
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 Appendix Table 1A. Time periods used in the study 
 
Panel 1.  Event period and the estimation periods used for the event study 
Period First day Last day Number of days in period 
 Event day Date 
Event 
day Date 
Open 
days 
Closed 
days 
Week-
days 
Total 
days 
12 months 
period T-5 7.3.95 T+223 29.2.96 229 29 258 360 
18 months 
period T-5 7.3.95 T+344 30.8.96 350 39 389 543 
Event window 
period T-5 7.3.95 T+50 6.6.95 56 10 66 92 
 
Panel 2.  Pre-BOLT and post-BOLT periods used for the comparison analysis 
 First day Last day Number of days in period 
 Event day Date 
Event 
day Date Open  Closed  
Week-
days 
Total 
days 
Pre-BOLT 
period T-345 1.9.93 T-6 6.3.95 340 54 394 552 
post-BOLT 
period T+51 7.6.95 T+401 29.11.96 351 37 388 544 
 
NOTES: 
(1) Event day = the day relative to the day of the BOLT introduction (T = 14 March 1995) 
(2) Open days = number of weekdays that the BSE was open for trading 
(3) Closed days = number of weekdays that the BSE was closed due to holidays, strikes, payment crises, technical 
breakdowns etc. 
(4) Weekdays = number of open days + number of closed days. 
(5) Total days = number of weekdays + number of weekend days.   
(6) 30 August, 1996 and 29 November, 1996 both fall on a Friday, hence they are the last trading days of the 
respective months.  
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1 This typically involves a shift from call to continuous and/or automated trading. For example, 
the Tel Aviv stock exchange gradually shifted from a call auction to continuous trading 
(Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach, 1997); and the Taiwan stock exchange switched from 
a semi-automated to fully automated trading (Chang et al., 1999; Lang and Lee, 1999). 
2 Roell (1992), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) and Khambata (2000) note that tight 
disclosure requirements, auditing and accounting standards create confidence among 
investors. 
3 Kim and Singal (2000) find that opening the exchange to foreign investors increased 
efficiency and reduced exchange rate and inflation volatility in 20 emerging stock markets. 
4 The Mumbai Stock Exchange is usually known by its acronym which uses the former name 
of the city, Bombay.  Hence, "BSE". 
5 We discuss the nature of Badla in more detail in section 2 of the paper. 
6 We thank Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas for supplying this material to us. 
7 The discussion in this section draws heavily on information provided by the Stock Exchange, 
Mumbai on its web site at www.bseindia.com. 
8 See Agarwal (1996) and Singh (1998). 
9 Shah and Thomas (1997) survey the changing role of the Indian financial markets during the 
1990’s.  They examine the rise in the use of financial markets for resource allocation, a role 
that was traditionally fulfilled by the banking system.  They also review the reasons for the 
lack of efficiency and high transactions costs on the BSE prior to the introduction of the NSE 
in 1994, and the subsequent modernisation of the BSE. 
10 The fraud is usually attributed to Harshad Mehta who was involved in large-scale share-
dealings in mainstream and defunct companies using funds obtained from certain public 
sector banks. 
11 The NSE was set up by a group of financial institutions with the intention of becoming a 
model exchange.  It began trading in debt securities in June 1994, and in equity shares in 
November 1994.  Equity market trading started with 200 stocks and, by December 1995, 
1300 stocks were traded and the NSE had become a more liquid market than the BSE (Shah 
and Thomas, 2001). 
12 Shah and Thomas (1996) describe the BOLT system.  
13 "Jobbers" are dealers. 
14 The distinction between A and B shares is explained below. 
15 As of November 11, 2002, and following a reclassification exercise by the Exchange.  
16 The data were extracted from DATASTREAM and matched with that on the PROWESS 
database (CMIE, 1997) to ensure that the sample consisted exclusively of A and B shares of 
non-financial private sector Indian firms. 
17 Non-synchronous trading in the index poses more difficult issues than does thin trading in 
individual shares (Chan, 1992).  We deal with the latter problem in our estimation of the 
market model; see the discussion in section 4. 
18 Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach (1997) constrain their model to just 3 parameters across 
a 36 day window. 
19 Dimson’s analysis was concerned with the estimation of the market model using the standard 
event study methodology (2), but it applies a fortiori to the event dummy method (6). 
20 The probability of a trade in any given trading day can be as low as 0.3.  See Dimson (1979). 
21 In the trade-to-trade approach, the market model (1) is expressed in terms of the multi-
calendar-day return rather than the per calendar-day return as in (2). More precisely it is 
written: 
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Here, Rk,t,n is the return on stock k between two consecutive trading days, day t - n to day t, 
and Mt,n is the corresponding return on the market index.  Since the time interval between 
closing prices on consecutive trading days will vary depending on the day of the week and 
holidays, the errors in (2') are heteroskedastic, with a variance of n  (Maynes and 
Rumsey, 1993).  Therefore, (2') can be efficiently estimated by OLS after dividing through 
by tn .  Since the return being modelled is a multi-calendar-day return, the subsequent 
adjustment (4) to calculate the ARs is no longer required.  Another difference between the 
Dimson and trade-to-trade method is that with the latter, the number of ARs (and therefore 
CARs) vary from firm to firm depending on whether the stock was traded on the particular 
event window day. 
22 These include all the shares in our sample. 
23 The highest average daily abnormal return for A sample over the entire event window (3%) 
occurred on day 3. 
24 The highest average daily abnormal return for B sample over the entire event window (5.1%) 
occurred on day 3. 
25 GDP at factor cost is taken from the Reserve Bank of India (1999). The market capitalisation 
data was obtained from the web site of the Stock Exchange, Mumbai (2001) at 
www.bseindia.com. 
26 None of the CARs is equal to zero. 
